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Recent Changes in the Evidential Requirements in Indirect Sex and Race 
Discrimination Cases  
 
Sam Middlemiss, Subject Leader for Law, Margaret Downie, Lecturer in Law, The 
Robert Gordon University. 
 
In this article the evidential issues and requirements relating to indirect sex and race 
discrimination cases will be discussed with particular reference to important and/or 
recent changes in the law.  
The complexity of this area of law, particularly evidential requirements, has 
frustrated the efforts of employees or workers attempting to achieve equality in the 
workplace and statutory changes over the last ten years have tried to address this 
problem 
Given the similarities between the legal rules applying across the different areas of 
UK equality law (sexual orientation, age and religion or belief) most of the issues 
identified here in relation to sex and race discrimination will have general 
application. 1
 
 
Introduction 
The following quote is helpful in explaining the nature of indirect discrimination 
claims: “Here the challenge is made to a rule or practice that on its face respects the 
principle of equal treatment, but the effect of which is disproportionately to exclude a 
protected group… The law of indirect discrimination examines how equal treatment 
                                            
1  There are no provisions for indirect discrimination in the Disability Discrimination Act but the 
requirement for reasonable adjustments under section 6 of the Act extends to a provision criteria or 
practice which is the terminology used in the definition of indirect discrimination 
may have the effect, whether or not intended or foreseen, of continuing patterns of 
exclusion” 2
The essential quality of indirect discrimination dictates that there are various 
evidential requirements which applicants must meet to succeed in a case of indirect 
discrimination which are not required in cases of direct discrimination. 
 
 
The Changing Definition of Indirect Discrimination 
Although the changes to the definition of indirect discrimination brought in under the 
Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof) Regulations SI 
2001/2660 and Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005 
(considered below) cannot be claimed to be recent their importance in these cases 
means they must be given due consideration here. 
Under the 2001 Regulations the terms “requirement or condition” in the definition of 
indirect discrimination under section 1 of the SDA3
                                            
2  Collins, H Employment Law (2003) Oxford University Press p 59 
 were replaced with the much 
broader terms of “provision, criterion or practice” for certain important sections of the 
Act 1 (1) (2) (b) including employment matters.  This resulted in an easier evidential 
requirement for the applicant in indirect discrimination cases to establish since these 
terms are capable of being interpreted broadly.  The new definition avoids the need to 
comply with the “absolute bar” requirement previously advocated by the Court of 
Appeal as the threshold requirement in indirect discrimination cases (See for example 
the case of Perera v Civil Service Commission [1983] IRLR 166, CA).  
3  Terms which still apply to non-employment matters under section 1(1)(b) of the SDA and equivalent 
section of the Race Relations Act 1976 
Since the 2001 Regulations came into force the terms “provision, criteria or practice” 
have been widely defined by Employment Tribunals.  It is for the applicant to show 
(PCP) that the treatment complained of amounts to a PCP. It may be a written or oral 
instruction or it could be part of a policy, procedure or collective agreement or be 
contained in a contract, letter or written particulars etc. It might refer to specific 
practices or be one of several criteria used.  It could apply to just one employee or to a 
group of employees. It may even be sufficient to amount to a provision if the conduct 
complained of has happened on only one occasion.4
Similar alterations to the definition of indirect race discrimination apply the new 
definition to discrimination in the employment are on grounds of race, ethnic or 
national origins. 
  Common examples of PCP’s 
include age limits, dress codes, refusal to allow part time working and imposition of 
mobility clauses.  
5
 
  
The Relevance of a Particular Pool for Comparison 
Once a PCP has been established, the next evidential hurdle the applicant has to 
overcome is to prove that this PCP puts him/her at a “particular disadvantage”. Since 
the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005 removed the words 
“to the detriment of a considerably proportion of member of one sex” from section 
1(2) (b) (1) of the statute it might be the case that statistical evidence of indirect 
discrimination is not always required by the employment tribunal.  There may be less 
reliance on workplace or occupational statistics as tribunals are more willing to rely 
                                            
4 British Airways Plc v Starmer [2005] IRLR 863 
5 The “old definition” continues to apply to discrimination on grounds of colour, race nationality 
or ethnic or nationall origins. 
on national statistics and the common knowledge that women have primary 
responsibility for childcare.6
When statistical evidence is used in this way it is important in deciding on the 
relevant pool for comparison for the purposes of an indirect discrimination claim that 
the applicant tries to second-guess the pool that the Employment Tribunal will choose 
as appropriate. In Jones v University of Manchester [1993] IRLR 193 the applicant 
was excluded from employment as a careers adviser as the University (wanting 
someone close to the age of the students)  had restricted eligibility for this post to 
graduates aged 27-35. She was forty six years of age and the basis of her claim was 
that the requirement was indirectly discriminatory as female mature students tended to 
be older than male mature students and by definition fewer women could comply with 
the age requirement than men.  
  On the other hand, individuals bringing indirect 
discrimination claims can only prove they are a victim of discrimination through 
comparison with a group or class of workers rather than an individual.  So a female 
applicant for a job faced with a height requirement might choose to compare the 
relative position of women and men in terms of height in a certain geographical area 
(e.g. Scotland, The United Kingdom).  The use of statistics therefore remains one 
important way of proving “particular disadvantage”, used in conjunction with other 
evidence 
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument claiming that the appropriate comparators 
were all persons meeting the relevant criteria. “It is, in effect, the total number of all 
those persons, men and women, who answer the description contained in the 
                                            
6   London Underground v Edwards  [1997] IRLR 364 CA 
advertisement, apart from the age requirement. Here, that means all graduates with the 
relevant experience.” 7
In the event that an applicant chooses a pool for comparison which is incorrect he or 
she may lose their case.
  
8
“Choosing the pool for comparison carefully is therefore decisive for success of an 
indirect discrimination claim where a strictly statistically established disparate impact 
is required.” 
  
9 The relevant pool is a matter of fact for the Employment Tribunal to 
determine 10
In an equal pay claim Lord Justice Sedley in the Court of Appeal provided a rather 
cynical but accurate overview of this requirement. 
 but, as illustrated in the Jones case, they do often prefer to choose a 
broad pool (e.g. all women in UK eligible to apply for a job). They will expect 
statistical evidence to be produced and led to support assertions of indirect 
discrimination.  
11 “The correct principle, in my 
judgement, is that the pool must be one which suitably tests the particular 
discrimination complained of: but this is not the same thing as the proposition that 
there is a single suitable pool for every case. In fact one of the striking things about 
both the race and sex discrimination legislation is that, contrary to early expectations, 
three decades of litigation have failed to produce any universal formula for locating 
the correct pool, driving courts and tribunals alike to the conclusion that there is 
none.”12
                                            
7       Evans LJ pp 228-291 
 
8        Pearce v City of Bradford Metropolitan Council [1988] IRLR 378 EAT 
9       Schiek, D Waddington, L Bell, M Non-Discrimination Law (2007) Hart p 401 
10      Kidd v DRG (UK) Ltd [1985] IRLR 190, EAT 
11    Paragraph 27 
12    Mrs V Grundy v British Airways plc 2007 EWCA Civ 1020 
The Women and Equality Unit's guide Changes to Sex Discrimination Legislation in 
Great Britain: Explaining the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) 
Regulations 2005 highlights the usefulness of statistics in establishing particular 
disadvantage: “This may be apparent from a comparison of the statistics of male or 
female workers or applicants who are at a disadvantage, i.e. that a larger proportion 
of one sex experiences a detriment. Statistics can be helpful in ascertaining relative 
disadvantage, however they are not essential.” 
In indirect race discrimination choice of the comparator is arguably even more 
difficult because the application of section 3(4) of the Race Relations Act 1976 
requires that the circumstances of the comparator must be the same or not materially 
different from the applicant.  Therefore the pool will be more restricted.  In Hanly v 
Norinchukin International it was held that when selected only British employees for 
redundancy the Japanese employees on secondment from Japan were not the correct 
group for comparison because they were not at risk of dismissal.  Their 
circumstances were materially different from the British workers. 
The impact of the correct selection of the comparison group in race discrimination 
case is also illustrated in the case of BMA v Chaudhury.13
                                            
13 2007] EWCA Civ 788 
  Mr Chaudhury claimed 
that in failing to support his claim of racial discrimination against the BMA was 
indirectly discriminating against him  His pool for comparison was all members of 
the BMA and he won his case before the tribunal and EAT.  On appeal the Court of 
Appeal held that the “the appropriate pool comprised all BMA members who want 
the advice and support of the BMA for race discrimination claims against the 
specific regulatory medical bodies. No member of that pool could comply with the 
condition or requirement imposed by the BMA. It follows that there was no 
comparative disadvantage or advantage for any racial group and no indirect race 
discrimination against members of the racial group to which Mr Chaudhary 
belonged.” 14
 
  The  BMA’s appeal was successful. 
Detriment 
 The applicant must go on to show that their inability to meet or comply with the 
provision, criterion or practice caused them to suffer a detriment.  The degree of 
detriment needed to substantiate a discrimination claim for the purposes of this Act 
and other equality legislation was until recently unsettled.15 In Ministry of Defence v 
Jeremiah [1979] IRLR 436, CA it was defined as merely ‘putting under a 
disadvantage’. In other cases however something more has been looked for. In 
Schmidt v Austicks Bookshops Ltd [1977] IRLR 360, EAT it was not sufficient 
detriment for a woman to be required to wear a dress under the company rules. 16
To establish a detriment it is not necessary to establish a breach of contract but it is 
necessary to show that the applicant had been disadvantaged in the circumstances in 
which he/she had to work.
  
17
In Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] IRLR 285 the 
issue of whether someone had to suffer economic or physical consequences of the 
 In Ealing LBC v Garry [2001] IRLR 681 the applicant 
was able to establish a detriment on the basis of race when an investigation into her 
behaviour took much longer to investigate than other cases even though she did not 
know it had continued after the normal length of time for an investigation.  
                                            
14 Mummery LJ at para 202 
15    Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] IRLR 285 House of Lords  
16     In De Souza v Automobile Association [1986] IRLR 103, CA a racial insult made in a 
conversation overhead by a typist about her was an insufficient detriment 
discriminatory behaviour before a detriment could be established was considered by 
the House of Lords and they decided that it wasn’t necessary. The detriment claimed 
in this case was the loss of the right to carry out appraisal interviews with police 
officers. They went on to find: “however, an “unjustified sense of grievance” cannot 
amount to a detriment 18 and their Lordships held that in the absence of economic or 
physical consequences the “reasonable worker” test formulated by Brightman LJ in 
the Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [1980] QB 87 had to be satisfied in order to show 
a detriment.  “a detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the view 
that the [treatment] was in all the circumstances to his detriment.” 19
As Mummery LJC explained in R exp Elias v S of s for Defence
 
20
In cases where the applicant has been forced to resign because of difficulty in 
complying with a PCP then this would be evidence of detriment but it will be 
necessary for the applicant to establish the causal link between the PCP and the 
detriment suffered.  In the MacMillan case the applicant failed to establish this link. 
 “the focus is not on 
the difference in treatment on racial grounds, express or implied, it is on the 
evaluation of the disparate and adverse racial impact of the application of an 
apparently neutral and general provision, criterion or practice.” 
Justification 
In most indirect discrimination cases the defence of justification is available if the 
employer can show that the types of discriminatory activity were ‘justifiable’ by an 
employer on a ground other than race or sex (or under other equality statutes). 
                                                                                                                             
17      Sexual harassment will represent a suitable detriment in most cases  
18  Barclays Bank plc v Kapur and others (No 2) [1995] IRLR 87 
19  p 104 
20 2006 EWCA Civ 1293 at 3237 
There are differences in the rules for justification for age discrimination brought in 
under the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations SI 2006/1031. Under Regulation 3 
of the Regulations there is provision for a general objective justification defence for 
both direct and indirect age discrimination. 21
In Ojutiku v MSC [1982] IRLR 418 CA the Court of Appeal said that the standard for 
proving a justifiable reason other than sex should be “what was acceptable to right 
thinking people as sound and tolerable reasons for adopting the practice in question.” 
  
22
This was not a very helpful definition for Employment Tribunals and the European 
Court of Justice in Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH V Weber Von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607 
  
provided clarification of the standard of proof required. as “
The approach adopted by the ECJ in Bilka - Kaufhaus has now been enshrined in 
statute and since 2005 
the objective of the 
employer's measure must correspond to a real need of the enterprise and the means 
used must be appropriate with a view to achieving that objective and be necessary to 
that end”.  
23
The employer must demonstrate objectively justified factors which are unrelated to 
discrimination based on sex. The employer must show that there is real business need 
 it has been a statutorily recognised defence to show that the 
action complained of was proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  
                                            
21 The Regulations make provision specific exceptions from the scope of the prohibitions on age 
discrimination: the use of certain age-based or age-linked criteria ( in particular in imposing mandatory 
retirement ages)  fixing age limits in minimum wage and New Deal programmes, using seniority-based 
benefit schemes and fixing access requirements for occupational benefits. These are exempted from 
any requirement to show that they are objectively justified. 
22          In Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board [1987] IRLR 26, HL the House of Lords held that 
the concepts of justification in indirect discrimination and equal pay cases should be interpreted in the 
same way 
23    Regulation 3 Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations S.I. 2005/2467  
for the discriminatory outcome and the means chosen to achieve the outcome are 
suitable and necessary.24
Useful guidance on the issue of justification under the previous definition was given 
in 
 
Hampson v Department of Education & Science [1989] IRLR 69 that was: (a) the 
test for justification was objective (b) the standard was the reasonable need of the 
undertaking (c) that reasonable need might be, but is not confined to, economic or 
administrative efficiency (d) the Employment Tribunal in considering the matter must 
strike an objective balance between the discriminatory effect of the practice 
complained of and the reasonable need of the undertaking.  
 
More recently, the Court of Appeal  has said, in deciding whether the application of a 
discriminatory provision, criterion or practice is proportionate to the means to be 
achieved, there is a three stage test set out in R (on the application of Elias) v 
Secretary of State for Defence [2006] IRLR 934, CA): 
1. Is the objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right?  
2. Is the measure rationally connected to the objective?  
3. Are the means chosen no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective?  
One reason often put forward by employers as justification is Health and Safety.  
Whilst this will often be successful25
                                            
24      Anderman S Chapter 8 pp 103-109 Dine, J Watt, B Discrimination Law Concepts, Limitations 
and Justifications (1996) Longman 
 there must be some real evidence to back the 
claim up.  In the British Airways case (supra) the argument failed.   
25 Singh v British Rail Engineering 1986 ICR 22  
Similarly cost implications are often cited as justification for a PCP.  The impact on 
the employer will be considered in the light of its size and resource and balanced with 
the adverse impact on the affected employee(s). The ECJ has held for example, that 
indirect discrimination cannot be justified by the aim of restricting public 
expenditure.26  However where the employer is a private organisation financial impact 
is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration.27 Employers seeking to use this as a 
defence will be expected to provide a thorough and analytical analysis of the 
economics of the business and its working practices28
Recently the EAT has gone so far as to hold that unlawful and dishonest actions can 
amount to “a proportionate means of establishing a legitimate aim” although this case 
is subject to appeal.
 
29
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Lord Justice Mummery in the Court of Appeal in the case of Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry v Rutherford (No.2) [2005] ICR 119 described the legal rules dealing with 
indirect discrimination as a ‘lamentable state of complexity and obfuscation.’ 30
This overview of the issues cannot do justice to the complex evidential requirements 
arising in indirect discrimination cases. 
 
31
                                            
26 Schonheit v Stadt Frankfurt am Main 2003 ECJ 1-12572 and Steinicke v Bundesanstat fur arbeit 
[2003] Case C-77/02 
 This article has attempted to provide a 
concise and simplified version of the legal rules applying in indirect sex and race 
27 Cross &ors v British Airways plc [2005] IRLR 423 
28 See comments of LJ Thomas in Hardy & Hansons v Lax 2005 
29 GMB v Allen and Ors  
30   The House of Lords decision can be found at Rutherford (No.2) v  Secretary  of State for Trade and 
Industry [2006] IRLR 551, HL 
31    For detailed analysis see Connolly, M Townshend-Smith on Discrimination Law, Text Cases and 
Materials 2nd ed. (2004) Cavendish Publishing, Chapter 10 
discrimination cases particularly identifying evidential obstacles that apply in these 
cases and recent changes in the law which have modified or removed these obstacles.  
Despite these developments, which are to be welcomed, the evidential burden on an 
applicant bringing a claim for indirect discrimination is still considerable.  
The chances of the legal enforcement against this form of discrimination achieving 
the ambitious objectives highlighted for it in the following quote are definitely 
improved. 
“Indirect discrimination law does have the potential to recognise the ethical demand 
that society should make some attempt to secure some degree of redistribution of 
wealth and opportunities from privileged groups to those who have been historically 
less privileged. “ 32
 
 
 
 
                                            
32   Ibid p 238 
